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Justice in Assistance: A Critique of the ‘Singer Solution’ 
This article begins with an examination of Peter Singer’s ‘solution’ to global 
poverty as a way to develop a theory of ‘justice in assistance.’ It argues that 
Singer’s work, while compelling, does not seriously engage with the 
institutions necessary to relieve global poverty. In order realise our 
obligations it is necessary to employ secondary agents, such as NGOs. 
However, we should be concerned that the affluent and their secondary 
agents are complicit with unjust institutions. Indeed, these agents can 
create troubling social relationships with those whom they seek to help. 
What is needed is a theory of justice in assistance. This is a distinct area of 
justice theory because these agents are neither primary agents, like states, 
but they often provide the basic social goods that we associate with primary 
agents. The article ends by putting forward a provisional conception of 
justice in assistance based on the republican idea of non-domination. 
Keywords: Peter Singer, Justice, Poverty, Humanitarianism, Non-Ideal Theory 
Is it wrong to donate money to alleviate global poverty? This seems like a 
ridiculous question. The billion worst off human beings live in conditions of 
extreme hunger, disease, ignorance, and fear. Peter Singer has argued 
repeatedly over the past forty years that doing nothing to help the global 
poor is like letting a small child drown in a shallow pond. It is morally 
repugnant. If you can prevent another person from suffering, then you have 
an obligation to do so. I do not dispute this claim. Singer’s analogy is so 
powerful because it is so simple. However, assisting distant strangers is not. 
In order to satisfy our obligations to the global poor, we need secondary 
agents, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to deliver 
assistance. These secondary agents, and their affluent sponsors, might be 
complicit with unjust social institutions that produce global poverty. 
Indeed, despite their good intentions, they might produce unjust 
relationships with the people they are trying to help. This article argues 
that humanitarian and development assistance raises problems of justice 
that Singer is ill equipped to handle. What is needed is a theory of ‘justice 
in assistance,’ understood as regulatory principles tailored for the aid 
relationship. Justice in assistance is a special type of non-ideal theory 
because the agents whose behaviour it regulates are not primary agents of 
justice, like the state, which have the responsibility to distribute basic social 
goods in ideal circumstances. However, as Onora O’Neill has observed, 
these agents often take on this responsibility on a temporary basis when 
relieving global poverty (2001, 191-2). Consequently, they should be 
subjected to claims that regulate how they distribute goods and ensure that 
they facilitate the primary agent of justice in re-establishing itself. Justice 
in assistance is a useful concept because it can provide a framework to 
critique and strengthen organisations like the Sphere Project and the 
Humanitarian Ombudsman Project, which have sought to provide rules and 
dispute resolution mechanisms for NGOs and the global poor. It satisfies 
Singer’s belief that ethics should provide guidance for pressing real world 
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problems but remains sensitive to the complexities of the addressing these 
problems.  
 Before moving forward, I will clarify the distinction between personal 
ethics and justice that will feature in this article. Personal ethics deals with 
the moral actions of individual human beings in a general sense. I am not 
concerned with the specific content of individual morality, but only its use 
as a category (Tan 2004, 21-4). Justice is understood as a practice-
dependent form of morality that addresses social institutions and 
relationships. When human beings engage in social relationships or share 
social institutions it produces the need for principles of justice for purpose 
of regulation (Sangiovanni 2008, 138). John Rawls’ statement that “justice 
is the first virtue of social institutions” is rooted in this concept of justice 
(1999b, 3). This is not to deny that there might be a notion of justice as a 
personal virtue, or that justice can apply to non-humans, or that a coherent 
practice-independent notion of justice is plausible. These are simply the 
conceptions used in this article. They are justified because Singer is explicit 
about his approach as a form of personal ethics and has stated that his 
solution to global poverty is compatible with practice-dependent theories of 
justice (2002a, pp. 127-8; 2002c, 123-4).  
The article will be structured into three parts. The first will set out 
Singer’s argument for the relief of global poverty, how these duties can be 
satisfied, and the function of secondary agents in the argument. It will show 
that Singer’s analysis of NGOs is limited to matters of efficiency, even 
though he recognises important unquantifiable elements. The second 
section will address the problem of complicity with injustice. The final 
section will sketch the contours of justice in assistance via a conception 
based on non-domination.  
1: The ‘Singer Solution’ to global poverty 
Singer’s argument that we have duties to alleviate the extreme 
poverty of distant strangers has two prominent components. The first is a 
thought experiment that engages his reader’s moral intuitions. The second 
is a formal argument that generalises these intuitions and shows how they 
apply in the case of global poverty. The thought experiment involves a 
drowning child which was first put forward in Singer’s 1972 article Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality and elaborated in his later work such as Practical 
Ethics and The Life You Can Save (1972, 231; 1993, 229; 2009, 3). We are 
asked to imagine a university professor on his way to deliver a lecture. His 
path goes by a shallow pond and in this pond is a child who is in immediate 
danger of drowning. The professor can easily rescue the child, as the pond 
is neither deep nor dangerous. He is also the only person capable of acting. 
However, the rescue will have a price. It will cause the professor’s clothes 
to become wet and muddied, while his shoes will be completely ruined. He 
will have to go home and change, which will prevent him from delivering 
his lecture (Singer 1993, 229).   
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 The question posed by this thought experiment is whether the 
professor is under an obligation to rescue the child. The answer must be 
yes, as the professor endures trivial burdens by muddying his clothes, 
ruining his shoes, and missing his lecture. The child, on the other hand, 
endures the non-trivial burden of death if the act is not performed.  Since 
the professor has the capacity to rescue the child without enduring an 
unreasonable burden, such as risking his life in the effort, Singer makes the 
claim that there is a duty to perform the rescue and that to fail in this duty 
would be morally blameworthy (Singer 2002b, 156).  
 One may question why the professor has the responsibility to pull the 
child from the pond. No context is given for how the child came to be in the 
pond or whether there might be another agent that bears the burden of 
responsibility (Miller 2007, 233-8). So perhaps one could argue that this 
rescue is non-obligatory because the child has no particular claim on the 
professor’s actions just as a particular cause has no claim to one’s charity. 
Yet, Singer rejects this reasoning, because it is within the professor’s power 
to rescue the child. If, after failing to rescue the child, the professor justified 
his inaction by claiming that he did not know the child or there was some 
other agent who was the proper duty-bearer he would be subject to 
legitimate moral blame (Singer 1972, 213; 2009, 3, 145-6). However, this 
argument demonstrates Singer’s willingness to abstract individuals from 
social institutions, which will have troubling consequences when 
considering the problems of complicity (Singer 1972, 231-2).  
The purpose of the thought experiment is to give an uncontroversial 
example of a duty of rescue: where it gains purchase in Singer’s general 
argument is through the claim that there is no relevant moral distinction 
between it and the situation between the global affluent and the global poor. 
Those who possess even moderate wealth in the developed world could, with 
little cost to themselves, save the lives of some of those in extreme poverty. 
It may be true that those suffering in poverty are distant strangers, but this 
is irrelevant. 
This claim at first seems rather wild, but Singer claims that the 
thought experiment and the relief of poverty share three premises. The first 
premise is that absolute poverty is bad for those subjected to it, just as 
drowning is bad for the child. This is uncontroversial. Absolute poverty 
being defined as ‘a condition of life so characterised by malnutrition, 
illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality and low life 
expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency’ 
(Singer 2002b, 81). This matches the moral condition of the global poor with 
that of the drowning child. In both circumstances, an uncontroversial wrong 
can be identified. 
The second premise links responsibility with capacity. If it is within 
the power of an agent to prevent a moral wrong, without sacrificing 
something of comparable moral value, then there is an obligation to prevent 
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it. The professor in the thought experiment bears the duty to rescue the 
child because he has the capacity to do so and it would not cost him anything 
of comparable moral significance (Singer 1972, 231). The second premise 
should be noted since it has a strong influence on the practical guidance 
offered by Singer. The second premise contains a limiting condition, which 
prohibits duties that require significant sacrifices (Singer 1972, 241). One 
is not obligated to rescue a drowning child from a lake that is infested with 
alligators, as it would put one's life in immediate danger. It should also be 
noted that Singer acknowledges that this may be too demanding since there 
are few things that have comparable moral significance to the life of an 
innocent person. He offers a moderate position that simply reduces the 
limiting condition to not sacrificing “something morally significant” (Singer 
1972, 241). This leaves the understanding of moral significance to the 
judgement of the duty-bearer (Singer 1993, 231-2; 2009, 16-7).  
The final premise is that it is within the power of the affluent to 
alleviate at least some absolute poverty and that it can be prevented 
without the sacrifice of something of moral significance. This is also a 
relatively uncontroversial claim since it is also limited. It does not assert 
that all global poverty could be easily eradicated with little cost to the duty-
bearers. It merely asserts that some global poverty can be alleviated 
without imposing unreasonable costs on duty-bearers. It does not require 
that assistance to distant strangers be optimal or problem free, just that it 
works some of the time and saves some lives (Singer 1993, 231-2).  
These three premises lead to the conclusion that, as living in absolute 
poverty constitutes a wrong that can be at least partially relieved by the 
world’s affluent without a sacrifice of something of comparable moral 
significance, the relief of some absolute poverty is a duty that attaches to 
relatively affluent individuals. This duty holds regardless of the distance 
between agents or whether they share social institutions like the state. 
Living in absolute poverty is no less deplorable for a distant stranger than 
it is for a close friend. Denying that one has a duty on these grounds would 
be comparable to the professor who does not pull the child from the pond 
because he is unknown to him.   
The above thesis has been used to justify what has become known as 
the ‘Singer Solution’ to global poverty. Singer is know for his advocacy of 
‘practical ethics,’ which is the reasonable notion that academic philosophy 
should provide guidance for the moral dilemmas we face in everyday life.i 
The duties found in Singer’s argument have a notable characteristic. They 
are imperfect. This does not mean that they have less moral significance 
than perfect duties, but it merely means that they are incomplete. Usually 
this means that while the duty-bearer is identified there is ambiguity about 
the content of the duties or to whom exactly they are owed (O'Neill 1999, 
pp. 144-8; Sen 2011, pp. 373-4). This makes these duties highly 
discretionary. This does not mean that they are optional, but the way in 
which they are satisfied is contingent on the disposition of the duty-bearer 
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(Singer 1993, 231-2). Singer relies on honesty of his duty-bearers (2009, 17). 
This is often thought of in terms of how much people give ranging to 
marginal utility or any income beyond what is necessary, which Singer 
thinks was justified, to between 5% and 10% of annual income, which he 
advocates as reasonable (Singer 1972, 234; 1999; 2006; 2009, xvi-xv). 
However, it also applies to the means by which poverty is relieved. The child 
in the pond cannot demand to be rescued in a particular way, say fireman’s 
carry versus a piggyback ride, and the global poor cannot demand that aid 
take the form of microfinance as opposed to large scale infrastructure 
investment. In other words the way in which duties to the global poor are 
satisfied depends on the arbitrium or judgement of the duty-bearer. The 
desires and interests of the duty-recipient are not part of the argument, 
except perhaps insofar as they may be factored into a calculation of utility. 
He offers guidance for two ways to satisfy these duties. The first is to 
increase the quantity and quality of state-based foreign aid to the global 
poor. The second is to make direct donations to NGOs that are engaged in 
relieving poverty. The focus of Singer’s writing has been on the second 
option. This is because the second option is something that will have an 
immediate effect on the lives of the global poor, whereas government reform 
may be a long time in coming. (Singer 1972, 239; 1993, 241-2; 2009, 36). 
However, these are not mutually exclusive options. It may be desirable to 
have a lifeguard by the pond or a fence that will deter small children, but 
their absence should not prevent the professor from rescuing the child.  
 Yet, there is a gap between Singer’s guidance and his initial 
argument. The professor’s duty to the child can be satisfied by a brief and 
discrete action by the professor; all he needs to do is wade into the pond, 
pull the child to shore, and perhaps deliver the child to their guardian or 
another responsible adult. All of these actions are within the personal 
capacity of the professor. However, Singer’s solution does not require 
identical actions. Duty-bearers are not required to personally help those 
suffering from poverty’s ill effects. Instead, he advises, among other things, 
that individuals should give money to NGOs so they can organise relief 
efforts. This, however, introduces secondary agents into Singer’s solution 
and with it the distinction between unmediated and mediated capacity. 
 The second premise of Singer’s thesis is that if an individual has it in 
their power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing 
something of comparable moral value, they have an obligation to do so. The 
critics of Singer have focussed on the limiting condition in this statement, 
but have neglected what it means to have the power to prevent something 
bad from happening. In the case of the drowning child, it is incontrovertible 
that the professor has it within his power to save the child. This is not the 
case with global poverty. The addressees of Singer’s argument do not have 
it in their power to prevent or relieve global poverty in an analogous way. 
This is illustrated by the example of the Gates Foundation. Bill and Melinda 
Gates created the foundation in part to alleviate the problem of global 
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poverty. They endowed the Gates Foundation with a significant part of their 
personal wealth, approximately $24.5bn. Yet, in order to help alleviate 
global poverty, even Bill Gates needed to create a complex organisation to 
manage and distribute funds. The way he exercises power is distinct from 
the way the professor does, even though the Gates family constitutes the 
executive board of the foundation, because he requires the necessary 
assistance of secondary agents to satisfy his duties. This also applies to 
persons who do not possess wealth comparable to the Gates family. The 
average person in the developed world possesses a relatively large share of 
wealth when compared to a person in absolute poverty, but they do not have 
the wealth to create a philanthropic foundation. They can give to NGOs to 
finance relief efforts, but they do not exercise power over these 
organisations in the same way the professor exercises power over his body 
to rescue the child. The claim that affluent persons have it in their power 
to prevent some global poverty in a way that is directly analogous to the 
professor’s power to rescue the drowning child is inaccurate. The latter’s 
capacity is unmediated; the former’s is mediated.  
At this point a truculent critic may decide to dig in his heels and say 
this is a minor divergence, but has no real significance. It is evident that 
Singer does not consider secondary agents to be a problem. In Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality Singer wrote so cavalierly about NGOs that it 
deserves to be quoted at length: 
From a moral point of view, the development of the world into a 
“global village” has made an important though still unrecognised, 
difference to our moral situation. Expert observers and supervisors, 
sent out by famine relief organisations or permanently stationed in 
famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost 
as effectively as we could get it to someone on our own block. (1972, 
4)  
We find in his early work the opinion that there really is not that much of 
a difference between pulling a child out of a pond and relieving global 
poverty. Secondary agents are portrayed in a way that is akin to the limbs 
of a person; NGOs rescue people from poverty in the same way that the arm 
of the professor pulls the child out of the pond.  
 In his recent work, Singer has expressed a more nuanced 
understanding of secondary agents. However, there is a fundamental 
continuity between his early work and his current work, insofar as the only 
matter taken under serious consideration is that of effectiveness. In The 
Life You Can Save, he focuses on how individuals can select the NGO that 
will provide the most effective means to help the global poor. To his credit, 
he appreciates that this requires more than trusting the press releases from 
NGOs that show how they minimise administrative costs. This alone cannot 
assess the effectiveness of assistance. He points to work done by Holden 
Karnofsky and Elie Hassenfeld. They found it very difficult to assess the 
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effectiveness and transparency of charities and eventually founded 
GiveWell, an NGO dedicated to improving transparency and effectiveness 
in other NGOs (Singer 2009, 82-5). Karnofsky and Hassenfeld also extended 
their analysis to organisations like the Grameen Bank. This organisation 
was founded by Muhammad Yunus and provides microfinancial support to 
poor persons in South Asia. The loans are insignificant to most Westerners, 
the example given is a $40 loan to start a restaurant, but they provide basic 
capital that people can use to pull themselves out of poverty (Singer 2009, 
91). Singer does express some concerns about the efficacy of microfinance 
but says there is sufficient evidence that they improve the life of the poor 
even if they don’t make them into entrepreneurial dynamos (Singer 2009, 
92). Their work is admirable and necessary, but it says little about the social 
relationships that NGOs have with the global poor. The transparency and 
accountability is directed towards duty-bearers, not recipients. It assesses 
outcomes, but not the means by which these outcomes are achieved. Singer’s 
analysis of secondary agents is limited to the efficiency by which they can 
transfer resources from the affluent to the poor.  
Singer does gesture towards concerns beyond efficiency when writing 
about recipient involvement when dealing with his work with Oxfam 
America and Oxfam Australia. He points to work done with ‘ragpickers’ in 
India. These women were typically lower caste Dalits who work in 
deplorable conditions for a pittance. Oxfam actively involved them in 
shaping the character of the project to meet with their own desires. When 
the recipients decided it was time for Oxfam to leave, the NGO left behind 
a stronger community with a recognised union, The Registered Association 
of Ragpickers (Singer 2009, 95-6). Similarly, he gives the example of 
Oxfam’s work in Mozambique engaging in legal reform to improve the 
status of women in that country (Singer 2009, 97). What is interesting about 
Singer’s support of initiatives designed to empower recipients in the aid 
relationship and in the post-aid environment is that he acknowledges their 
value but cannot explain why there are valuable. He writes, “it isn’t possible 
to quantify the impact of Oxfam’s work” (Singer 2009, 97). This shows that 
focussing on quantifying aid’s effectiveness, while important, may draw 
attention from another important dimension of development: the sorts of 
social relationships that are produced by international assistance.ii 
2: The Complicity Problem 
The shortcomings of Singer’s approach become evident when looking at how 
Singer insulates his duties from existing social institutions and 
relationships. Cosmopolitan critics have argued that he does not address 
the causes of poverty. This critique will be explored and furthered. It is not 
enough to say that Singer does not take into account how the international 
system can cause absolute poverty, but we must also ask if duty-bearers 
and their secondary agents are complicit with this system.   
 These critics share common ground with Singer. They are, like him, 
cosmopolitans. The difference between Singer and his cosmopolitan critics 
  Word Count: 
8,107     
     (excluding abstract, notes, and 
references) 
 8 
is methodological. Singer focuses on individuals, whereas his critics focus 
on the justice of institutions. The charge institutional cosmopolitans bring 
against Singer is that by focusing on what individuals ought to do to 
alleviate global poverty, he overlooks how the transnational system causes 
global poverty (Kuper 2002a, 126). So long as the transnational system 
allows powerful agents to compel weaker ones into unfair agreements and 
allows governments, no matter how corrupt, to exercise control over 
resources and borrowing, global poverty will remain a problem (Pogge 2008, 
18-9). Donating all of one’s surplus income to charities might relieve some 
absolute poverty, but it does nothing to alter the systemic causes of global 
poverty (Kuper 2002b, 111-2).  
They are on the right track, but Singer has an apparently convincing 
reply to cosmopolitan critics. The different methodologies indicate that they 
are interested in different questions. Singer may agree that the 
transnational system produces or exacerbates global poverty and supports 
the cosmopolitan agenda of reform. However, given that a fundamental 
reorganisation of the transnational system will not occur in the foreseeable 
future, individuals need to ask what they should do to alleviate global 
poverty in present circumstances (Singer 2002a, 128). Consequently, the 
institutional cosmopolitan critique is misplaced since it addresses a 
different, though related, topic in the literature on global poverty.  However, 
this answer is not satisfactory, because we cannot easily separate the duty-
bearers or the secondary agents from the world in which they exist. This 
raises concerns about whether affluent persons and the NGOs they fund are 
complicit with injustice. My concern is not only about complicity with unjust 
international institutions, but with injustice within the aid relationship 
itself. 
Singer’s duty-bearers cannot be separated from the international 
system. Affluence has a history and, if we accept the cosmopolitan 
argument, it’s an unpleasant one. Thomas Pogge has argued that the 
international system is characterised by structural problems that foster 
extreme poverty to the benefit of citizens in the developed world. 
Specifically, he points to resource and borrowing privileges (Pogge 2008, 
118-22). The former allows states, regardless of their character, to sell the 
natural resources of their territory and the latter allows states to borrow 
from international institutions. This has the effect of destabilising fragile 
states, because these privileges can be extremely lucrative and this 
incentivises coups d’état (Pogge 2008, 154-8). However, the more pressing 
concern is the use of coercion by developed states in setting the rules of the 
global economy. Agreements, such as The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), have proved controversial 
because they protect patents on medicines and have undermined the 
generic pharmaceutical industry in the developing world. This has caused 
many people to fail to receive fair access to affordable medication for life 
threatening illnesses (Pogge 2008, 224-9).  
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 This connects to Singer’s argument because the affluence that makes 
citizens of the developed world duty bearers is connected to these structural 
injustices. Let us return to the Gates Foundation, which was created by Bill 
Gates using the wealth he earned from founding and helming Microsoft. 
The Gates Foundation may put its endowment to good use by financing 
development projects in Africa or vaccines for diseases that 
disproportionately affect the poor, but, if the cosmopolitans are correct, then 
this wealth has come from an unjust system that privileges large 
corporations like Microsoft. Moreover, the Gates Foundation manages its 
endowment like a hedge fund. It is used to make investments that will 
sustain the Foundation’s coffers over the long term. In 2007, it became 
known that the Gates Foundation, via Warren Buffet’s donation of 
Berkshire Hathaway stock, was invested in the Sudanese oil industry 
(Piller 2007). The Gates Foundation was accused of supporting and 
profiting from the Sudanese government despite the widespread 
condemnation of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. After this association 
was made public, the Gates Foundation withdrew its investments from 
Sudan. The Gates Foundation should not be singled out. This argument can 
be generalised to the citizens of the developed world. An average middle 
class person might have their pension invested in one of the large 
pharmaceutical corporations that benefits from TRIPS, they might 
purchase clothes made in sweatshop conditions, the shrimp that they serve 
as an appetiser might have been caught by people who are slaves in all but 
name in Thailand. If we accept, as Singer does, the claim that the 
international system is unjust then we cannot ignore that most people in 
the developed world are complicit with this system because they reap the 
benefits (Singer 2002a, 127-8; 2009, 28-33).  
The complicity with the international system is not simply a matter 
of dirty hands, but there is a parallel concern that NGOs sustain unjust 
circumstances by ameliorating the worst excesses of the international 
system. These organisations are co-opted into enforcing the coercively 
imposed rules of international cooperation. Critical development theorists, 
such as Arturo Escobar, have claimed that NGOs are a component of a 
system that perpetuates a “politically and technically manageable” form of 
underdevelopment (Escobar 2012, 46-7). That is, when states in the 
developing world accept the terms of cooperation laid out by the World 
Trade Organisation or accept loans from the International Monetary Fund 
they must comply with certain conditions such as terminating protectionist 
trade policies, liberalising the economy, and cutting public sector spending. 
This often exacerbates inequalities within these states, but international 
NGOs often ease the transition by “filling the gaps” left by the withdrawal 
of the state. This has the effect of depoliticising socioeconomic justice by 
placing it in the hands of private agents and exercising ideological discipline 
over the discourse of poverty and development (Escobar 2012-2; Ferguson 
1994, 254-6, 275-7; Hulme and Edwards 2013, 276-9). The activities of 
NGOs in Bangladesh provide an example of this. These organisations have 
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recently employed micro-credit as a means to assist the very poor, especially 
women. However, the debt-relations produced by micro-credit facilities 
have had unanticipated negative consequences for the very persons they 
were trying to help. Lamia Karim, for example, found that loans delivered 
to poor rural women with the intention of allowing them to gain a measure 
of fiscal independence had the effect of reducing local solidarity, as the 
recipients of loans would then lend money to others at usurious rates and 
then establish micro-financial cartels (2001, 100-1). They may alleviate 
some poverty, but there is a cost to the community. This helps to explain 
why Sauveur Pierre Étienne claims that NGOs act as “the iron spear of neo-
liberal policies” and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call them “the 
mendicant orders of empire” designed to discipline recipient communities 
into conforming with the international system that contributes to their 
immiseration (Étienne 1997, 236; Hardt and Negri 2000, 36; Schuller 
2007b, 98). This claim seems a little extravagant. However, the point made 
by these critical theorists is well taken. We cannot segregate the practices 
of NGOs from the broader global system and there is at least a case to be 
made that they support, perhaps unintentionally, the system that fosters 
global poverty in the first place.  
Yet, even if we set aside the problem of international complicity there 
remains the problem that the aid relationship itself raises questions of 
justice. There are three issues I will examine: undermining the state, 
perpetuating complex emergencies, and facilitating exploitation. The way 
in which NGOs can undermine the state is overdetermined, but I will 
address several recurring themes. The most simple of these is that the 
presence of NGOs diminishes the human capital available to states in 
recipient communities (Easterly 2002-3, 227 fn.4; Morton 1997, 24; Schuller 
2007a, 90-1). These organisations often offer wages that greatly exceed 
those offered by the public sector and this prompts an “internal brain drain” 
to NGOs. The consequence is that the state is less able to satisfy its 
obligations of justice, because those who possess the expertise to maintain 
the state have been drawn away to work elsewhere. The effect of this change 
in the labour market is not limited to reduced institutional capacity: it also 
produces a new sector in the economy that develops its own interests. People 
employed by NGOs have an interest in maintaining their relatively 
lucrative and high status employment. Consequently, this provides 
incentives to prolong relationships of assistance (Anderson 1999, 42-3; 
Jackson 2005, 178-9; Schuller 2007a, 91-3). The creation of what Mark 
Schuller calls the “NGO class” helps to show that relations of assistance can 
profoundly affect the structures of the societies in which they operate in a 
way that is at cross purposes with the aim of assistance(de Waal 2011, 136-
8; Schuller 2007a, 91-3).  
NGOs also divert other resources away from the state. The growth of 
NGOs in the past thirty years as one of the primary means to assist those 
in poverty has also created a vicious circle regarding public institutions. 
NGOs attract funds that have, in the past, gone directly to states in 
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developing countries. This is in part because of the belief that these 
organisations are more accountable, that they work closely with the persons 
that are in need of assistance, and that they make more efficient use of 
resources. It may be that this is the case, but drawing away these resources 
from the state creates a self-fulfilling prophecy; the state will have less 
resources, with which it will be able to do less than it could previously, 
which will enhance the perception that NGOs are better positioned to be 
agents of assistance (Hulme and Edwards 2013, 4-7). Stephen L. Esquith 
has recently made the argument that NGOs in Mali inadvertently 
facilitated the recent coup d’etat. The organisations working in Mali became 
the “fourth branch of government” (2013, 380). By providing access to 
important social goods they came to be viewed as more legitimate than the 
state. Consequently, Malians became less willing to support the state or pay 
taxes. This was not the intention of the NGOs but as Esquith points out 
their self-proclaimed neutrality or bystander status made them blind to the 
impact they were having on Mali (2013, 383).  
This connects with the concern that by siphoning off resources from 
the state, NGOs usurp its legitimacy. Large NGOs can exercise a great deal 
of influence over state policy. In some cases a few organisations have come 
to act as essentially private government ministries that take charge of the 
provision of social goods. In Bangladesh during the 1990s, for example, sixty 
percent of foreign funds entering the country went to the eight largest 
NGOs; these funds were used to create a hierarchical structure in which the 
majority of smaller, often local, organisations were dependent upon their 
liberality. The absence of accountability mechanisms helped to set up these 
organisations as new social elites with little evidence as to whether they 
were actually improving the lives of the intended targets of assistance 
(Karim 2001, 96). Moreover, by enticing educated classes with better career 
prospects, they assimilated potential critical groups (Karim 2001, 97-98). 
This does not imply that these organisations have questionable motives or 
that they are not improving the lives of the global poor. However, it does 
raise concerns about whether they are effectively displacing the state rather 
than buttressing it. Instead of supporting the state, NGOs become rivals to 
it or remake it in their own image (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 994; Kamat 
2003, 167-71; Matanga 2010, 114).   
Although there is a trend towards larger NGOs, it is common for 
there to be numerous small and medium sized organisations operating 
inside fragile states. It is not so much a “cartel” of powerful organisations, 
to use William Easterly’s term, but, to use Laura Zannoti’s term, a 
“cacophony” (Easterly 2002, 243-7; Zanotti 2010, 757-62). Mark Schuller, 
for example, travelled to Haiti in 2002 and found that the Haitian 
government office in charge of monitoring the activities of non-government 
organisations had not updated its list since 1995, when it was updated in 
2005, two-thirds of the contact information was out of date. Although it is 
supposed to receive annual reports from all organisations operating in 
Haiti, it is clear that this is at the discretion of the organisations (Schuller 
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2007c, 74). In these circumstances numerous NGOs carve niches within 
recipient communities, sometimes overlapping and replicating services. 
They can constitute an obstacle to recipient states being able to enact 
national policies, since these organisations can mobilise their own 
constituencies against policy options that run against their interests 
(Mathews 1997, 53-5; Pierre-Louis 2011, 192-3). Yet, in situations of 
“cartels” and “cacophonies,” there are reasons to be concerned that NGOs 
do not support the state, but rather produce rival bases of power.  
The second concern is that NGOs can perpetuate complex 
emergencies. This is especially evident in the militarisation of refugee 
camps. In the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide many international 
NGOs recognised that they had exacerbated the crisis. When Rwandan 
refugees fled to what was then Zaire following the Genocide, especially in 
the area surrounding Goma, the NGOs and the leadership of the refugee 
camps acted as a “state-in-exile” that operated without oversight from the 
Zairian government (Lischer 2003, 107). NGOs supplied aid to refugees, 
among those were many directly or indirectly involved in the genocide and 
were waging a guerrilla campaign against the new Rwandan government. 
(Dijkzeul and Wakenge 2010, 1148; Tong 2004, 183-4). For example, those 
moving into refugee camps run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were 
forced to pay camp leaders, often associated with genocidiaries, for basic 
goods such as plastic sheets, food, and water. These goods were provided by 
MSF and were supposed to be free of charge to refugees but wound up being 
used to finance continued violence (Terry 2002, 190).  Although they were 
aware of this, humanitarian organisations continued to pour assistance into 
the camps and played down the relationship between the refugees and the 
genocide. The consequence was that they were feeding militants, supporting 
the dependents of militants, granting militants legitimacy, and stabilising 
the war economy (Anderson 1999, 42-44; Barber 1997, 10-11; Cooley and 
Ron 2002, 27-8; Lischer 2003, 83-5; Terry 2002, 37-47). It should, however, 
be noted that the French section MSF and the International Rescue 
Committee did eventually withdraw from Zaire, but it did so after much 
internal debate and with a great deal of external criticism from other NGOs 
in the area (Terry 2002, 2-4, 195-8).   
Finally, there is also the chance that NGOs can be complicit with 
injustice caused by their own employees. There are examples where the 
employees of NGOs have used their power for despicable ends. An example 
of this would be the sexual abuse of women and children in West African 
refugee camps. In 2002, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children-UK investigated 
allegations of sexual misconduct and confirmed not only widespread 
exploitation of women and children in refugee camps, but that some of the 
perpetrators were employees of NGOs, including MSF, the American 
Refugee Committee, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent (Reyes 2009, 215-6). The abusers used their control over the 
distribution of basic social goods, such as food or employment opportunities, 
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to gain sexual favours from women and young girls. Moreover, the victims 
found themselves in a situation where they were unable to speak out 
without the fear of incurring negative repercussions due to ineffective 
accountability mechanisms and lack of knowledge about their own rights 
(Csáky 2008, 12-14; Reyes 2009, 216-8) This is an exceptional perversion of 
international assistance, but it is a useful example as it shows that 
arbitrary power can be directed towards exploitative ends.  The fact that 
power relations within the aid relationship could allow this type of abuse to 
occur serves to show, in an admittedly extreme way, why we should be 
concerned about justice in assistance. It is the capacity for exploitative 
terms of social cooperation that is the worry rather than actual instances of 
exploitation.  
 This section has argued that it is incredibly difficult to speak about 
the relief of global poverty as a matter of individual action, since there are 
strong reasons to assume that Singer’s duty-bearing agents and the 
secondary agents required to satisfy duties to the global poor are complicit 
with unjust social relationships and institutions. At the global level there is 
the problem of duty-bearers benefitting from unjust economic relationships 
with the duty-recipients and their secondary agents supporting the 
continuance of this system by ameliorating its worst elements. At the 
domestic level, secondary agents can undermine the state, perpetuate the 
conditions that warranted intervention, and be a source of exploitation.  
3.0:  Conceptualising Justice in Assistance 
This should not be taken as a wholesale rejection of Singer. He is correct to 
argue that our duties to the global poor require swift action and cannot be 
limited to long-term structural reforms of the international system. 
However, he did not in 1973 and does not, as of his latest major intervention 
in 2009, seem to appreciate the problem of complicity with injustice in the 
international system and within the aid relationship. This is why a theory 
of justice in assistance is necessary; it seeks to reconcile moral urgency with 
the regulation of social institutions. This concluding section will examine 
how justice in assistance differs from individual ethics and cosmopolitan 
theories of justice by sketching a tentative conception based on non-
domination and how it could affect international aid.  
Justice in assistance is distinct from individual ethics in that it aims 
to regulate social institutions rather than individual actions. It is similar to 
practice-dependent theories of justice. Although, it is more closely related 
to non-ideal theory, as it shares the assumption that some agents are 
unable or unwilling to comply with duties of justice (Rawls 2001, 13). If this 
were not the case there would be no need for something like the Singer 
Solution, since extreme poverty seems incompatible with any reasonable 
ideal theory of justice. However, it is distinct from non-ideal theory, which 
has been thought of as derivative. Ideal theory provides the principles of 
justice and non-ideal theory seeks to realise them in circumstances of non-
compliance (Rawls 1999a, 89-90). Where justice in assistance differs is that 
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it recognises that social institutions set up in non-ideal circumstances might 
require principles of justice suited to them in particular. This is in line with 
Rawls’ claim that “the correct regulative principle of a thing depends on the 
nature of that thing” (1999b, 25).  
A theory of justice in assistance must be tailored to the nature of 
international assistance. However, the nature of the agents, such as NGOs, 
that would be regulated by these principles is problematic. O’Neill’s 
taxonomy of agents of justice is useful here. Primary agents of justice are 
those that determine how to institutionalise principles of justice. Secondary 
agents of justice, in contrast, are charged with supporting the primary 
agents of justice and conforming to the principles of justice (O'Neill 2001, 
181).iii It seems uncontroversial to assert that NGOs are of the second 
category, while the state is commonly thought to be the default primary 
agent. The claim NGOs should be suborned to primary agents of justice is 
plausible in ideal theory, but what has been overlooked is whether this is 
possible in non-ideal circumstances.  
 The role of a secondary agent of justice is supportive, but NGOs 
operate in circumstances in which there is no primary agent to support or 
the primary agent is so enervated that it cannot meet its obligations. This 
leaves NGOs in an ambiguous position. In these circumstances, O’Neill has 
argued, these organisations often act as secondary agents by badgering 
states into enforcing principles of justice, but they also take on duties that 
are often associated with the state as the primary agent of justice (O'Neill 
2001, 191-2). If a NGO provides access to basic social goods such as 
education, health care, or access to food, it is operating beyond the bailiwick 
of a secondary agent of justice. This gives them characteristics that are 
associated with the primary agent of justice. It seems, therefore, that the 
distinction between primary and secondary agents loses its sharpness in 
practice. NGOs behave like hybrid agents by attempting to support infirm 
primary agents of justice while at the same time taking on their distinctive 
functions. The problem of this mixed position has been addressed in this 
article. NGOs, by acting as pseudo-primary agents of justice, can 
inadvertently undermine the capacity of weakened states to reassert 
themselves in their role as the primary agent of justice, while benefitting 
from or creating social relationships that can be considered unjust. 
This is why justice in assistance is required. It regulates these agents 
on the terms of their practices.  If they partially assume the role of primary 
agents of justice, they should be subject to the claims individuals make 
against primary agents to ensure that they are meeting their obligations. 
However, this role is provisional. They are not meant to replace the state as 
the primary agent of justice. These are organisations that must eventually 
wither away or revert to their ideal theory role as secondary agents. 
Consequently, a theory of justice in assistance must have a teleological 
component, as it aims at ending or at least alleviating poverty, and side-
constraints on how these agents can exercise their power. The teleological 
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component is uncontroversial. Secondary agents need to work towards 
realising an ideal theory view of the world, regardless of whether it is 
utilitarian, cosmopolitan liberal, or a form of statism. The issue of side-
constraints is more interesting.  
 The problems identified in this article point to the problem of 
unaccountable power in assistance. This has strong resemblance to 
republican worries about domination. Their central claim is that the 
antithesis of liberty is domination as opposed to interference (Pettit 2012, 
8-11). Domination is understood in the following terms: 
 A social relationship is dominating if X, an agent, possesses the 
capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the choices available to Y, a 
dependent agent.  
If we accept that NGOs may dominate the global poor it does not imply that 
they act with malevolence. Domination is about structural distribution of 
power between agents, not about their intentions. It is not characterised by 
the psychological disposition of any of the agents involved (Lovett 2010, 43-
7). Pettit uses Torvald’s benevolent but suffocating paternalism towards 
Nora in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House as an example of this (1997, 60). What 
matters is that one agent has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the 
choices of another not their reasons for doing so. Domination is a concern 
because of the way that it undermines the minimal autonomy of persons 
subjected to it. Minimal autonomy in this case refers to the capacity of a 
person to formulate and pursue a reasonable plan in the society of other 
persons over a complete lifespan (Laborde 2010, 54-5; Lovett 2010, 130-1; 
Pettit 1997, 90-2). This notion of autonomy does not imply that there is a 
single “good life” worth pursuing, but that it is important that individuals 
are able to develop and pursue their own conception of a good life. 
Domination constitutes a serious impediment to this. The majority of aid 
workers may have the best intentions and do good work, but arbitrary 
power it can curdle into something grotesque and those subject to it tend to 
be aware of this. This is precisely the problem with the sexual abuse scandal 
in West Africa noted above. Indeed, it does not need to be intentionally 
exploitative to be problematic; domination can produce the moral blindness 
Esquith identifies with NGOs, which is comparable to Torvald’s shocked 
confusion when Nora leaves him (2013, 378). A dominating agent may cause 
harm unintentionally, because there is no way for dependent agents to hold 
them to account. 
Domination allows us to understand why recipients are often 
discontent with assistance. The Listening Project has conducted interviews 
with persons in post-aid situations. Recipients express a great deal of 
gratitude towards NGOs, but also frustration and resentment (Anderson 
2009, 97-105). There was the perception that aid projects are not aligned 
with the needs of recipients, but are tailored to the interests of donors. This 
is, in part, due to the drive towards accountability in assistance. The 
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problem is that accountability has become donor-oriented rather than 
recipient-oriented. This disrupts the feedback loop between recipients and 
NGOs, since recipients are unable to reward or punish these organisations 
in the same way as donors (Bebbington and Riddell 2013, 121-7; Cooley and 
Ron 2002, 22-3; Hilhorst 2002, 204; Macrea et al. 2002, 50-1; Reinikka 2008, 
180-1). Consequently, the recipients of aid come to view the input they have 
into the projects that deeply affect their lives as tokenistic, or fear that if 
they speak out of turn they may lose assistance. Consultation with NGOs 
may take place, but they do not yield substantive results, especially when 
these results would conflict with the aims or ideological dispositions of 
donors (Narayan et al. 2000, 106-7). If domination provides a framework 
that captures the problems identified in this article, then non-domination 
could be a plausible side-constraint in justice in assistance derived from 
respect for persons.  
Republican theories of justice have focussed on minimising 
domination rather than a blanket prohibition (Lovett 2010, p. 170-9). In the 
case of justice in assistance the focus must be on reducing arbitrariness, as 
the relationship between the affluent, NGOs, and the poor will always be 
characterised by an asymmetry of power and dependency. The affluent have 
resources the poor desperately need, if this was not the case there would be 
no need for assistance. It should be noted that this is independent of 
republican teleological commitments. Minimising domination should 
command an overlapping consensus if it is a corrective to the problems 
identified in the previous section.  
Minimising arbitrariness could provide support to projects like the 
Sphere Project and the proposed ombudsman for humanitarian assistance 
(HAO). The Sphere Project has attempted to create a humanitarian charter 
to establish minimum standards for NGOs working in disaster zones. It 
would allow recipients to know the rules of the relationship and hold donors 
and NGOs to account when they are not met. It also includes a consultation 
process for recipients (The Sphere Project 2011). This is complimented by 
the idea of a HAO, which would provide an independent and impartial 
institution to mediate disputes (Christoplos 1999). Neither of these are 
perfect initiatives. MSF has been very sceptical of the Sphere Project on the 
grounds that it would impose technocratic standards that would stifle 
innovation and be dictated from donors and powerful states (Tong 2004, 
184). The HAO has been met by scepticism about whether it could ever have 
the power to sanction NGOs and whether it could be immune to the 
influence of powerful donors (Mitchell and Doane 1999, 122-3). Both 
initiatives were criticised for being biased to the perspectives of donors and 
NGOs. In the case of Sphere, consultation has been stressed but what 
“meaning consultation” entails. Indeed, the provision that consultation can 
be set aside when it creates “additional risk”, indicates that NGOs possess 
a veto in the aid relationship (The Sphere Project 2011, p. 41). 
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If the empowerment strategies were pursued in a way that specified 
the influence that recipients have within the aid relationship and ensured 
that they had the means to hold NGOs to account via a sufficiently powerful 
invigilating institution, it would help to reduce domination in the practices 
of NGOs. This echoes the republican focus on the rule of law and democratic 
contestability as the means to constrain the power of the state. The 
combination of this sort of empowerment and accountability are attractive 
strategies, because they build on existing ideas within the humanitarian 
and development communities and are not in conflict with the values that 
most NGOs publically advocate. Minimising domination would allow the 
global poor to hold the affluent and their agents to account for their 
complicity with an unjust international system, while at the same time 
minimising the damage that can be done by NGOs through arbitrary power.  
 Global poverty is a problem of great moral urgency. Singer should be 
applauded for making a compelling and simple argument why the affluent 
have duties to assist people living in dire conditions. However, affluence has 
a history that is mired in injustice and, even if this were not the case, 
assistance can negatively affect the very people it tries to help. Justice in 
assistance recognises the teleological aim of ending poverty, but also 
recognises that there must be side-constraints. I have suggested that 
minimising domination is a plausible constraint on assistance. However, 
this is only the first and very tentative step in developing a complete 
conception of justice in assistance.  
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i “Second, ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good 
in practice. The reverse of this is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment 
that is no good in practice must suffer from a theoretical defect as well, for 
the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide practice.” (Singer 1993, 2) 
ii It seems to be a common mistake that Singer’s solution is a utilitarian 
approach to global poverty. He has been very clear for at least 20 years that 
it is not: 
“It’s no great secret that I’m a preference utilitarian, and so he could 
have inferred that I believe that goods ought to be distributed so as 
to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, in the long run. But in 
writing about the obligation to assist the world’s poorest people, I 
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want to reach people who are not utilitarians, so I don’t rely on 
utilitarian premises for that argument” (2002b, 127) 
Also refer to Singer 1993, 229-30. 
iii This is comparable to Rawls’ distinction between the social institutions 
that bear duties of justice and the natural duty to individuals to support 
and further just institutions. (Rawls 1999b, 6-10, 47-8, 293-301) 
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